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ABSTRACT. The diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina currently consists of an 
estimated 38,9% of Bosnia’s entire population. Together they provide for 13-
20% of Bosnia’s national GDP by consistently sending money to family and 
friends at home. They thereby actively contribute to the socio-economic 
development of their home country. Nonetheless, there are clear signs that the 
fulfilment of the existing potential would be much higher if national policies 
that actively support and assist Bosnian diaspora contribution would be in 
place. Research on the Bosnian contribution environment is, however, largely 
absent, predominantly due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the 
literature view the Bosnian diaspora as former refugees who have not (yet) 
returned, instead of as a permanent diaspora that can function as ‘agents for 
development’. This study aims to fill this gap and provide a first cautious step 
towards an overview of the most salient issues in the Bosnian-German 
migration and development environment. By applying Brinkerhoff’s model of 
enabling government roles, this paper argues that a lacking diaspora policy on 
the side of Bosnia and the restrictionist immigration and refugee policies of 
Germany form major obstructions to effective home country development 
contributions of Bosnian migrants in Germany. Hollifield’s theory of the 
‘liberal paradox’ and Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias’ approach on 
‘northern dominance’ further explain why national and international politics 
shape the presence of such policies, despite their obstructing effects on diaspora 
contribution.  
Introduction: The Development Potential of Diasporas 
With growing right-wing, popular, anti-immigrant sentiment currently strengthening 
its grip on many European countries with sizeable immigrant populations, there is a 
dire need to look at the positive impact of diasporas worldwide. Apart from the long-
recognized contributions that migrants make to their host countries, academics and 
politicians in migrant sending and receiving countries, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and international organisations have, for several decades, 
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increasingly acknowledged that migrants also provide the possibility of contributing 
to the socio-economic development of their countries of origin. In this way, migration 
and development domains have increasingly been linked in both the growing 
academic and political fields in order to analyse the negative and positive effects of 
migrants on their home countries. During the last two decades there has been an 
immense increase in money sent by migrants to developing home countries, from 
$31.1 billion in 1990 to $76.8 billion in 2000 and $325 billion in 2010, which has led 
to a renewed interest in migration and development (de Haas 2007; World Bank 
2011). These so-called remittances are an important reason for migrants to be viewed 
as ‘agents for development’, since their financial contributions have shown to have a 
positive, direct impact on poverty alleviation (Faist 2007). Hence, following these 
good results, other forms of diaspora contribution, such as the transfer of knowledge 
and skills (human capital) and networks (social capital), extend the migration 
development potential and spur worldwide interest from both migrant sending and 
receiving countries. 
However, upon recognizing this potential, the question arises whether the migration 
and development potential is being fulfilled and what the conditions are for diasporas 
to effectively contribute to their home countries. One way to formulate that the 
potential is not fulfilled is when one can identify people who have expressed their 
interest and have the ability to contribute but are not engaged in doing so. More and 
more national and international bodies pay attention to the question of how to create 
an enabling environment with conditions that facilitate the potential of diaspora 
contribution as much as possible (Brinkerhoff 2012). Even though there are a number 
of structural conditions that are subject to forces that are out of national reach, such as 
global economic relations, there is also a large part that is directly shaped by the 
national government. National government policies, in part, have the ability to create 
or at least influence the conditions that shape an enabling environment for diaspora 
contribution. De Haas (2007) even claims that “if states fail to implement general 
social and economic reform, migration and remittances are unlikely to contribute to 
nationwide sustainable development” (p. 25). The development effect of migrant 
contributions is hence conditioned by the government policies of the migrant sending 
as well as the receiving country – meaning, that the contribution potential of migrants 
is fulfilled to a higher degree when facilitating government policies are in place 
(Valenta and Ramet 2011). Some scholars do not only recognise the causal link 
between the national government and diaspora contribution, but moreover argue that 
the state carries a responsibility to support this contribution potential. For example 
Bakewell (2008), and Castles and Delgado Wise (2008) argue that a key 
responsibility lies with the government to provide ‘an appropriate legislative 
framework’ and play a proactive role in setting up institutions and programs to 
facilitate migration and development. 
The contribution environment of diasporas differs for each single case. Among many 
factors, this also has to do with the attention that is given to the topic of migration and 
development in a certain country. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina1, the interest 
for this issue is largely shaped by its recent war history. Partly due to this destructive 
civil war that took place in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, one third of its current 
population lives outside Bosnian borders. Over the last two decades, many of the 
refugees that resulted from the war have stayed, integrated, and some have even 
adopted new nationalities (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Nevertheless, to many, Bosnia 
still bears the image of the war-torn country, and literature on the Bosnian diaspora in 
many cases still perceives the diaspora as former refugees who have not (yet) 
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returned, instead of as a permanent diaspora. As a result, the recognition of the 
potential of the large Bosnian diaspora to function as ‘agents for development’ 
develops only slowly. Literature that analyses the Bosnian diaspora contribution 
environment in general is highly insufficient, and on the Bosnian diaspora in one of 
the most important destination countries, Germany, is lacking completely. This paper 
therefore aims to take a first step in filling the large literature gap that currently exists 
on the development contribution environment for Bosnians, and specifically for the 
Bosnian diaspora in Germany. This study examines which effects Bosnian and 
German government policies have on the development contribution potential of 
Bosnian migrants in Germany and why effective contribution facilitating policies are 
lacking. 
Primary sources such as policy papers and German and Bosnian government 
documents provide the basis of this paper’s data resources. Furthermore, since 
Bosnian government institutions such as the embassy in Germany and the relevant 
ministries provide for a very limited amount of official sources (in English), 
secondary data—including expert information—has also been put to use. Official 
correspondence with the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees provided 
missing information on Bosnia’s official stance towards migration and development 
and its diaspora policy. Additionally, two Bosnian researchers based in Sarajevo have, 
based on previous unpublished academic research, contributed further detailed 
information and provided insights for further analysis. Apart from the lack of 
information on Bosnian diaspora policy, data on the Bosnian diaspora in Germany in 
particular is also scarce. Two academics based in Germany who have conducted 
research among this diaspora community, albeit on a different topic, were able to 
provide information on the research population via personal correspondence and an 
informal interview with one of the scholars. 
Framing Effects of and Explanations for Government Policies   
In order to analyse the role of the government in diaspora contribution, the question 
that consequently needs to be asked is which government approach and government 
policies are actually necessary to enable and facilitate diaspora contribution. When 
this benchmark is established, the effects of an imperfect policy situation on diaspora 
contribution can be analysed. The following three theories provide this benchmark, as 
well as a framework that guides the analysis of why such policies are in place. Due to 
a gap in theories that specifically focus on the migration and development field, 
development theory and the political approach within migration theory provide for a 
theoretical basis for this paper’s research.  
Brinkerhoff (2012) has developed a framework on the role of the government in 
diaspora contribution, which aims to outline which actions governments can and 
should take to create an enabling environment for diaspora contribution to the 
development of the home country. The framework proposes five government-enabling 
roles: mandating, facilitating, resourcing, partnering, and endorsing. Mandating refers 
to the legal and regulatory framework that affects diasporas and the general political 
and socio-economic development of the sending country that support a general, 
developing environment. A government’s facilitating role provides incentives for 
diasporas to contribute, through active government support. Creating government 
agencies to connect with diasporas, support in improving diasporas’ living conditions 
abroad, and creating inter-diaspora networks can all lead to providing the conditions 
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for migrants to get involved in homeland contribution. Resourcing is mainly aimed at 
providing public funding and financial incentives for diasporas to engage in financial 
contributions such as remittances and foreign direct investment. In partnering, a 
partnership based on mutual interest is established between the government and 
diaspora organisations. Lastly, the role of endorsing points to the recognition by the 
government of the value that diasporas are to the homeland.  
In the model these government roles are then applied to Uphoff’s model on the 
access to power resources, government strategies of the diaspora option, and 
government agencies involved (locus). For the clarity of the argument, in this paper 
the government roles are only combined with Uphoff’s access to power resources in 
order to analyse the effects of German and Bosnian policies on migrant development 
contribution to Bosnia. Uphoff argues that diaspora contributions are facilitated when 
diaspora members have access to five types of power resources: “economic, social 
(social status based on social roles or on complying with socially valued criteria), 
political (ability to influence the exercise of authority), moral (perceived legitimacy of 
actions), and informational”2 (in Brinkerhoff 2012: 78). Government policies of both 
the sending and the receiving country can enable diasporas’ access to these power 
resources, be neutral, or pose barriers to them (Wescott and Brinkerhoff 2006). When 
applied to Brinkerhoff’s government enabling roles, certain government actions can 
actively provide support to access power resources and hence facilitate diaspora’s 
ability to contribute. 
Whereas Brinkerhoff only applies her model to the sending country, the application 
of Uphoff’s power resources enables the model to be extended to the receiving 
country as well, as this paper will aim to demonstrate. For the use of the model in 
practice, Brinkerhoff (2012) calls attention to a number of cautions. Firstly, the author 
remarks that even though it might be desired, governments are not necessarily always 
the most enabling partner. Secondly, not all governments may be as welcoming to the 
interference of their diaspora communities abroad. Especially where it concerns 
political influence, governments may view their diaspora as a threat, posing the ability 
for fuelling political opposition. This can especially be the case for countries with a 
history of intra-ethnic conflict, such as Bosnia. Thirdly, diaspora involvement does 
not necessarily benefit the society as a whole but may only selectively aid some 
individuals or families. Even more, the government could feel that diaspora 
contributions counteract the priorities of international organisations and government 
programs and thereby undermine other sources of aid. Lastly, this model presumes the 
unquestionable right to access of power for diasporas. For governments, the diaspora 
can be seen as an extra interest group next to the local residents who are just another 
group looking for power and resources (Brinkerhoff 2012). All together, these caveats 
may explain why certain policies are in place, specifically on the side of sending 
country Bosnia. 
When analysing receiving countries’ policies, and in specific immigration policies, 
Hollifield provides a theoretical basis. In the field of migration and development 
Hollifield (2000) recognises three major themes: national security, citizenship, and 
control in the meaning of “the role of the nation-state in establishing rules of entry 
and exit” (p. 185). Based on these three themes is Hollifield’s theory of the liberal 
paradox, which aims to explain the difficulty that lies with liberal democratic states in 
the regulation of immigration. The liberal paradox holds that there are two opposing 
powers of national immigration interest. The first is an economic liberal interest of 
openness, recognising the need for cheap foreign labour. Simultaneously, the pursuit 
of protecting national security produces a political interest of closure. These two 
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conflicting national interests shape immigration policy to a large degree (Hollifield 
1992) and help to explain German immigration policies. 
The focus on security and control in the migration and development field can be 
explained by the approach of Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias on northern 
dominance. This approach argues that the migration and development field is 
dominated by the northern hegemony of rich, northern countries and international 
bodies ruled by those same northern countries. Consequently, rich, receiving countries 
hold the ability to shape both the debate and set migration and development regulation 
(Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). The result is that an asymmetric relationship exists 
between the sending and the receiving country, in which the former is subordinate to 
the interests of the latter. Also, at an international level, migrant sending countries are 
dependent on international bodies dominated by the northern hegemony (Delgado 
Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2010). This approach helps to explain the bilateral 
relationship between Bosnia and Germany and the effect of international regulation 
on Bosnian policy. 
The Diaspora Contribution Environment of Bosnians in Germany 
In 2010, official accounts recorded a flow of remittances that reached USD 2.2 
billion3, sent by Bosnian migrants all over the world to friends and family in Bosnia. 
This was six times more than the amount of foreign direct investment and three times 
the amount of official development aid that Bosnia received. Bosnia places number 
fifteen on the world list of remittance-receiving countries in relation to GDP, with 
remittances making up 13-20% of Bosnia’s national GDP (Oruč 2011; World Bank 
2011). Not surprisingly, Bosnia is also one of the leading migrant ‘exporters’ in the 
OECD countries (Nikolić, Mraović, and Ćosić 2010). With currently about 1.46 
million Bosnians living abroad, its diaspora consists of an estimated 38.9% of 
Bosnia’s entire population (World Bank 2011). Nikolić et al. (2010) argue that during 
the EU accession process, this migration trend is likely to continue and even increase. 
One can conclude from this brief picture that Bosnia is a country that has a big 
potential to put its (very large) diaspora population to use to positively contribute to 
the development of Bosnia. As the European country containing the highest number 
of Bosnian migrants (approximately 240,000) except for Croatia, Germany is an 
important source of remittances to Bosnia (Ministry of Security - Immigration Sector 
2011). Hence, the Bosnian migrants in Germany form an important contribution 
potential to Bosnia. However, for such a development potential to be fulfilled, 
effective facilitating policies from above are vital (Brinkerhoff 2012). With 10.8 
million immigrants, Germany ranks number three on the world list of migrant 
destination countries, after the USA and the Russian Federation. Being one of the 
most prominent immigrant countries in the world, its immigration policy receives 
much attention both at a national and an international level (Bundesministerium des 
Innern [BMI] 2008; World Bank 2011). Therefore, to combine Bosnia’s extraordinary 
diaspora potential with Germany’s attention to immigration policy forms a relevant 
and unique case study on the effect of both migrant sending and receiving government 
policies on diaspora contribution. This paper attempts to provide a first cautious step 
towards an overview of the most salient issues in the Bosnian-German migration and 
development field. It will thereby mostly concentrate on German immigration and 
Bosnian diaspora policies, as a way to create a picture of the German Bosnian 
diaspora population and its development contribution environment. 
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To gain a background picture of the research population at focus, first the context 
and the general characteristics of the Bosnian diaspora in general and in Germany in 
particular will briefly be outlined. Subsequently, the most important Bosnian and 
German policies and their effects on diaspora contribution will be discussed, thereby 
focussing on three main policy fields. Lastly, an explanation will be sought as to why 
these policies are in place. 
Bosnia and its Diaspora (in Germany) 
With an unemployment rate of 70% among the youth (aged 18-30), it is not surprising 
that many young Bosnians view their future possibilities abroad (IOM and IASCI 
2010:129). While Bosnia still experiences the aftermath of the destructive civil war 
that took place between 1992 and 1995, its economic growth rates can be called 
‘decent’ but still a little lower than other nations at a similar stage of development 
(Jakobsen 2011). However, during the last couple of years its economy has stagnated 
and poverty levels are also considerable, with an estimated 17.8% of the population 
living below the poverty line (Ministry of Security - Immigration Sector 2011). It is 
very likely due to those reasons that Bosnia is currently an emigration country, with 
20,000 people moving to an EU country each year, versus approximately 9,500 
immigrants (ibid.). Estimations of the total number of Bosnians living abroad vary 
between 1,350,000 (the Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees) and 
1,461,000 (according to the World Bank) (ibid.). It is, however, very difficult to know 
whether these numbers are accurate, due to the different identification criteria and 
definitions of migrants, as well as the varying nature of statistical sources in the 
various host countries (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Nevertheless, what is certain is that, 
even though exact numbers are not available, the Bosnian diaspora accounts for a 
considerable share of the Bosnian population. 
An important characteristic of the Bosnian diaspora is its division along ethnic lines. 
The Bosnian population distinguishes between three ethnicities: Bosnian Croats, 
Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims, also known as Bosniaks. This ethnic division is 
consolidated in the political structure as laid down under the Dayton Peace Agreement 
in 1995, which consists of two separate entities: Republika Srpska and the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a weak central authority at the top. Republika 
Srpska is mostly inhabited by the orthodox Bosnian Serbs, whereas the catholic 
Bosnian Croats and the Muslim Bosniaks mainly live in the Bosniak-Croat Federation 
(Jakobsen 2011). While abroad, this ethnic division often continues to exist among 
Bosnian communities, of which many are organised on the basis of ethnic belonging. 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, who constitute the minority of the Bosniak-
dominated Bosnian diaspora, are often more attracted to Serbian and Croat migrant 
communities respectively than to mixed or Bosniak-dominated Bosnian organisations 
(Valenta and Ramet 2011). Some argue that this heterogeneity undermines internal 
solidarity among the diaspora and reinforces ethnic divisions (ibid.). 
The approximately 240,000 Bosnians that currently live in Germany arrived in 
roughly three phases. During the decades before the war and particularly in the 1960s 
and 1970s, tens of thousands of Bosnian builders, craftsmen and entrepreneurs 
emigrated with the help of Gastarbeiter (guest worker) programs to work in Germany 
(ibid.). At the outbreak of the war in 1992, large refugee streams resulted in a total 
number of 320,000 Bosnians that fled to Germany. While the largest share of refugees 
repatriated after the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, new waves of 
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economic migrants immediately followed, with mostly young people searching for 
better educational and economic opportunities (Ministry for Human Rights and 
Refugees 2008). Although no clear data exist on the exact legal status of every 
individual Bosnian case, what is at least clear is that up until 2009, 83,000 Bosnians 
have obtained German citizenship, and from 2002 no Bosnians in Germany hold 
refugee status anymore (Ministry of Security – Immigration Sector 2011). 
In a report based on information of the Bosnian embassy in Berlin, the Bosnian 
Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees claims that many, of which mainly highly 
educated, Bosnian migrants do not participate in migrant organisations, although a 
wide variety of Bosnian organisations exist in Germany. The majority of these clubs 
and associations are related to sports, religion, or the preservation of a local or 
regional culture. Also in Germany many, albeit not all, associations are organised on 
an ethnic basis and many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are involved in the 
national Serbian and Croatian associations in Germany (Ministry for Human Rights 
and Refugees 2008). There is no statistical information on exactly how many migrants 
are engaged in such diaspora organisations, as such networks often work informally 
and their existence and size highly fluctuate (Bundesministerium des Innern [BMI] 
2008). Apart from engagement with fellow Bosnians via migrant associations, other 
forms that contribute to maintaining the connection to the homeland are radio 
broadcasts4 and websites with news from Bosnia and the rest of the world.5 
Furthermore, satellite TV channels and Internet portals form an important source of 
information and connection with the country of origin (Ministry for Human Rights 
and Refugees 2008). A quick search on the Internet brings about a number of forums 
where (mainly young) Bosnians who live in Germany discuss a wide range of topics, 
using both the German and the Bosnian language. Themes range from inter-ethnic 
marriages to generational conflicts, where it often concerns the integration in German 
society. However, when compared to, for example, the Serbian diaspora (which is 
twice the size of the Bosnian diaspora), Bosnian broadcasts and news websites are far 
less widespread and not as organised. 
There are no existing data on exactly how many of those German-Bosnian migrant 
organisations are involved in some form of development contribution, nor to which 
degree Bosnians in Germany are individually engaged in any form of capital transfer 
to Bosnia. However, Dimova (informal interview, 3 March 2012) notes that during 
her research she found that there is a widespread network among Bosnian migrants in 
Germany, but that these have mainly social aims rather than philanthropic goals. Also 
on an individual basis, Dimova notes that there seems to be little involvement in 
contributing to Bosnia. However, the World Diaspora Association of BiH states on its 
official website that they aim to serve the interests of the diaspora as well as their 
home country (World Diaspora Association of BiH 2012). Moreover, they declare 
their dedication to the transfer of knowledge and experience in a process of 
cooperation, where they find the possibility (ibid.). Furthermore, the Bosnian Ministry 
for Human Rights and Refugees (2008) claims that there are many highly educated 
Bosnian migrants who do not have the time to engage in associations, but have 
expressed their willingness to cooperate with institutions within their respective 
professional field in Bosnia. To what degree such individual cooperations exist in 
practice can be questioned. Nikolić et al. (2010) argue that presently “the BiH highly 
qualified diaspora presents a largely untapped brain gain potential for the country” (p. 
33).  
One form of diaspora contributions that is more visible than human and social capital 
is the transfer of financial capital. According to a 2010 survey among 1.216 long-term 
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Bosnian migrants worldwide, 67,3% of Bosnian migrants in European countries 
indicated that they transfer money to BiH. Furthermore, the survey concluded that the 
overwhelming majority (81,3%) of financial remittances are sent through informal 
channels, since formal channels such as banks and money transfer operators (MTOs) 
like Western Union are considered too expensive. In line with international remittance 
trends, Bosnians abroad predominantly transfer money with the aim of supporting 
family and friends, and only a minority intends to use this money for saving, 
investment in a business, or to buy a house (IOM and IASCI 2010). Of all survey 
respondents only 6% indicated that they have invested in Bosnia, and another 6% that 
they kept savings in their home country (ibid.). According to Jakobsen (2011), these 
two sources of income are exactly what is necessary for economic growth to flourish 
in Bosnia now that, 17 years after the end of the war, the amount of monetary aid is 
decreasing. Remittances primarily fill this gap, but many question whether they have 
any positive effect on the Bosnian economy. Several studies note that there is some 
evidence that remittance flows have helped and continue to positively contribute to 
poverty alleviation (Jakobsen 2011). Nonetheless, the same studies also argue that 
remittances alone cannot bring about long-term sustainable economic development if 
flows of savings and foreign direct investment fail to increase (ibid.). 
Taken all together, there are considerable indications that the potential and 
willingness for the transfer of financial, human and social capital among Bosnian 
migrants worldwide and in Germany is currently not put to full use. The question then 
arises, why is this the case and which factors are obstructing larger Bosnian migrant 
development contribution engagement? 
The Effects of Bosnian and German Policies on Diaspora Contribution 
There are a varied number of policies that affect migrant contribution either directly 
or in more indirect ways. In this paper, government policies and measures are chosen 
that form the most salient points in German Bosnian migrant contribution, according 
to the characteristics of the chosen case study. Consequently, this study identifies the 
following three fields of government policies and measures: 
 
I. Policies on the general development environment of the sending 
country; 
II. Policies and initiatives on framing a migration and development 
policy; 
III. Policies that directly affect the mobility of capital or people. 
 
The chosen structure of policy division coincides up to a certain degree with 
Brinkerhoff’s five government roles. The role of mandating loosely overlaps with 
policy field I, whereas facilitating is discussed in field II, and resourcing in field III. 
The other two government roles of partnering and endorsing are not separately 
discussed, but instead are part of the three policy fields mentioned above. 
I. Policies on the Bosnian Economic and Political Environment 
After a recovery period that started immediately after the end of the war, the political 
and economic institutional framework in BiH is not yet where it should be in 
comparison with European standards (Jakobsen 2011). Data from the World Bank 
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Governance Indicators show the lack of progression of institutional quality in Bosnia 
between 1996 and 2008. In five of six dimensions of governance that are measured, 
Bosnia has consistently scored lower than the world average that lies at 0. Only the 
indicator for “Voice & Accountability”, which measures the level of human rights 
protection and democracy, has reached a positive score of 0,1 in 2004. As for the 
indicators of “Political Stability”, “Rule of Law”, and “Control of Corruption”, scores 
for all three dimensions have actually worsened during the given time span (The 
World Bank Group 2011). There are calls that the separated political structure results 
in an increasing political and social polarisation of the different ethnic groups in 
Bosnia, which also dominates public institutions, and that this is the major reason for 
economic progress coming to a halt (Al Jazeera 2011).  
As a result of this lack of a mandating role, the Bosnian economy is said to fail to 
provide a favourable business climate, in which long-term foreign direct investment 
could effectively lead to economic growth. This is even further exemplified when 
looking at Bosnia’s low scores on the ‘Ease of Doing Business Index’ of 2012 that is 
published on a yearly basis by the World Bank. Bosnia ranks number 125 of 183 
countries surveyed, and on the indicator of the ease of starting a business, only 20 
countries perform worse than Bosnia (World Bank 2012). Consequently, Bosnia 
receives low levels of trust in its political and economic environment and Bosnia 
holds a negative image towards potential foreign investors. For successful Bosnians 
abroad, sending money either to invest or to save in their home country is therefore 
not financially attractive, and a lack of economic power due to this restriction hinders 
further potential financial contributions. Another result of this weak economy is a 
high unemployment rate, especially among young adults. Many Bosnian migrants 
indicate that they would like to return if there would be worthwhile job opportunities 
(Al Jazeera 2011), but since their job prospects are almost nil, young migrants abroad 
are seriously restricted in their options to return to Bosnia. Moreover, the increased 
role of the informal economy causes a prevalence of corruption and organised crime 
(Jakobsen 2011), which further limits Bosnian migrants’ access to political and 
economic power and hinders potential Bosnian diaspora contribution. 
II. Policies and Initiatives on Framing a Coherent Migration and 
Development Strategy 
A. Coherent Migration and Development Policy in Germany 
Germany was among the countries in Europe that was relatively fast to convert 
migration and development debates into a political response. After having used its 
immigrants’ development potential for the industrial development of Germany, the 
German government has now also recognised the development potential of its 10,8 
million immigrants for their countries of origin. In January 2007, a motion was 
adopted by the German government that officially recognised the development 
potential of German immigrants, as well as the governments’ potential positive role in 
the assistance and encouragement of realizing this potential (Deutscher Bundestag 
2007). 6 In line with the stipulations that were laid down in the adopted motion, the 
German government has developed a migration and development strategy in which it 
has largely succeeded in adopting development-related migration issues into national 
development cooperation policy, which is known as the government approach of co-
development. Even though program implementation is to a small degree split between 
the Ministry of Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and the Federal Ministry for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), one can certainly speak of German 
policy coherence in the migration and development field. However, according to 
Musekamp (2008), program implementation is still in an early stage and relatively 
limited in comparison to French and English co-development programs. 
Aumüller (2005) notes that, in line with the European trend, early German initiatives 
to implement migration and development programmes were mainly directed at the use 
of development aid to decrease migration flows. A survey conducted in 2001 showed 
that repatriation support programs dominated German migration-oriented 
development aid policy at that time (Aumüller 2005). Nevertheless, in the past ten 
years German migration and development policy programs have developed and 
broadened their focus. The BMZ, which is the main ministry responsible in this field, 
has developed six focus points: to provide consultancy for governments of sending 
countries; to support migrant organisations in Germany; to relieve the conditions for 
remitting; to strengthen individual economic engagement via entrepreneurship or 
trade; to assist in voluntary return; and to encourage intercultural integration and 
engagement in migrant organisations (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung [BMZ] 2012b). The Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is the main implementing partner and has been 
assigned by the BMZ to develop mechanisms and concepts to put the migration 
potential to use (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [GIZ] 
2012b). GIZ executes programs on four of the above six focus points, where 
assistance of voluntary return and intercultural integration are dealt with by BAMF. 
Through its cooperation with already existing programs with diaspora networks, 
migrants become more and more involved in the shaping and implementation of 
development projects, thereby putting their knowledge to use. 
Even though in practice project implementation is still far from the official 
objectives, the adopted strategy can already cause a change in the contribution 
environment. First of all, Germany’s positive official standing point on migration and 
development gives German immigrants moral power, as their abilities and potential 
are recognised. Furthermore, by financially supporting diaspora organisations, the 
German government provides active migrants with the economic power to engage in 
philanthropic development projects, possibly next to individual contributions. Lastly, 
by actively including diasporas in close cooperation with the government, the 
individual migrants and networks involved might be able to increase both their 
political and their social power, since through political engagement there is potential 
for their social status to increase. Hence, Brinkerhoff’s enabling government role of 
facilitating, even though only applied to sending countries’ governments in her 
model, could here be recognised as currently being developed in Germany, even 
though its effectiveness is yet to be proven. 
It is doubtful, however, whether Germany’s facilitating role is also able to provide 
Bosnian migrants with access to these power resources. Of all programs currently 
implemented under one of the six priority fields, only one project has Bosnia as its 
focus group. There are, in comparison, multiple programs on Serbia that focus on 
cooperation with the Serbian diaspora population in Germany (Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [GIZ] 2012a). The Bosnian bilateral program, in 
contrast, concentrates on assisting the return of experts to Bosnia. The Centrum für 
Internationale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM), who executes the project for GIZ 
(Centrum für Internationale Migration und Entwicklung [CIM] 2012), thereby mainly 
works together with the Bosnian Agency of Labour and Employment (A. Telalović, 
personal correspondence June 2012). Apart from this single bilateral program, there 
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are also a small number of projects run by international organisations, which all focus 
on the same topic of the (temporary) return of qualified nationals. Examples are the 
Transfer of Knowledge through the Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program of the 
UNDP, and the Return and Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (RQN/TRQN) 
and the Migration and Development in the Western Balkans (MIDWEB) projects that 
are run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (Nikolić et al. 2010). 
Although Bosnia supports these international projects to a certain degree, Nikolić et 
al. (2010) remark that, when the IOM asked the Bosnian government to take over the 
TOKTEN project, there was no interest from their side to do so. 
The bilateral program is part of the general development cooperation strategy of the 
German BMZ. In this domain the BMZ runs an extensive development program in 
Bosnia, in which a large share of the attention goes to political and economic 
reconstruction. Encouraging political dialogue and institution-building are high on the 
list of priorities (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklung [BMZ] 2012a; Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2011). Hence, 
German general development policy is engaged in exactly those issues highlighted in 
policy field I as causing a disabling general development contribution environment in 
Bosnia. 
 
B. Bosnian Diaspora Framework 
Contrary to the current trend among many sending countries (Bakewell 2008), Bosnia 
does not have a separate Ministry for Diaspora, nor does it have a coherent diaspora 
policy framework in place. Instead, duties concerned with Bosnia’s diaspora are 
dispersed over several ministries and agencies at the central state level (instead of at 
regional or local levels). According to the Law on Ministries and Other 
Administrative Bodies of BiH, which was adopted in 2003, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has the responsibility to protect the rights and interests of Bosnian citizens, 
both temporary and permanent, abroad. Furthermore, it is concerned with the 
coordination of the work of Bosnian embassies and other consular bodies, and of the 
cooperation with emigrated Bosnians, either via the embassies or directly. Although 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an overall general task of cooperation with its 
diaspora, the main body responsible for diaspora policy is the Ministry for Human 
Rights and Refugees, and in particular its Department for Diaspora (Office of the 
High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003). This department is in charge 
of formulating a Bosnian diaspora policy, but until now they have not succeeded (R. 
Tihić-Kadrić, official correspondence, 7 August 2012). Lastly, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs and the BiH Agency for Labour and Employment both have small 
responsibilities on the education of migrant children abroad and on bilateral 
agreements on employment (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). 
Bakewell observes a trend among sending countries of an increasing number of 
government programs on the support and protection of their diasporas, most notably 
focussing on encouraging investment and facilitating return. However, in comparison 
with countries such as the Philippines and Morocco (Bakewell 2008), the Bosnian 
government provides very little support to its diaspora abroad. Programs on 
government assistance during pre-departure and integration in the host country are 
fairly absent. More importantly, programs on maintaining diaspora links with the 
home country, of central concern to migrant contributions, are kept to a minimum (A. 
Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). As highlighted by Bosnia’s only 
bilateral program with Germany, the majority of the programs and bilateral 
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agreements that concern the Bosnian migration population are aimed at migrant 
return. Furthermore, when, for instance, compared with Serbia, which has a separate 
ministry for Diaspora relations, Bosnia’s diaspora policy is highly disintegrated. 
The Bosnian diaspora themselves are highly unsatisfied with the lack of government 
support. A survey among highly skilled professionals living abroad shows the 
perception that the lack of initiative of BiH institutions and organisations causes a 
major blockage to the establishment of a relationship and cooperation between the 
diaspora and the home country. According to the same survey, “Thus far, the interest 
in cooperation is far greater among the actual members of expatriate scientific 
communities than among and within the institutions that could benefit from this 
cooperation” (Nikolić et al. 2010: 32). The World Diaspora Association of BiH also 
disapproves of the lack of government cooperation with its diaspora, since they see it 
as the government’s responsibility to provide diaspora support. Additionally, they 
condemn the incoherence of current actions on diaspora issues, as they note that it 
“brings the whole process to slowdown and inefficiency” (World Diaspora 
Association of BiH2012, para 16). 
Despite repeated calls for a coherent diaspora policy from the diaspora community, 
no such legislative framework has yet been adopted. This lack of legislative 
consolidation is in spite of multiple failed attempts of policy adoption and a 
preparatory process that started in 2008. In line with the promised accomplishments 
that were laid down in the IOM Framework Agreement on initiatives aimed at linking 
migration with the development of BiH and signed by the Bosnian Ministry for 
Human Rights and Refugees, the Bosnian government has assisted several research 
projects such as on the diaspora’s financial contributions (IOM and IASCI 2010). 
Additionally, it has supported several regional conferences on migration and 
development in the last three years.7 These preparations have led to a number of 
legislative drafts that until now have not been adopted. The first Law on BiH’s 
Cooperation with her Diaspora/Emigration was drafted and proposed by the Ministry 
for Human Rights and Refugees in 2009, but was refused by the Council of Ministers 
of BiH two years later without an official explanation. Up until today, no order to re-
draft the initial diaspora law proposal has been given by the Council of Ministers. The 
Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees has, however, included a number of 
diaspora issues, including reference to the recognition of the development potential of 
Bosnian emigrants, in drafts of three different national strategy proposals.8 All three 
drafts are currently pending at the Council of Ministers, two of which since 2010. If 
they would be adopted this would finally realise diaspora policy provisions, albeit in a 
highly incoherent way, and would mean a first step towards official recognition of the 
diaspora’s development potential on a state level (A. Telalović, personal 
correspondence, June 2012; R. Tihić-Kadrić, official correspondence, 7 August 2012). 
The effect of the BiH government’s lack of initiative to establish effective 
cooperation with its diaspora is that Bosnia is losing out on a number of nationals who 
are willing to contribute their human and social capital to the development of Bosnia 
(Nikolić et al. 2010). The lack of recognition and support hinders the diaspora’s 
access to moral power, as they are not recognised as contributors to Bosnian socio-
economic development. This in turn reduces the motivation of some migrants to 
transfer any form of capital, especially where it concerns philanthropic projects and 
not individual aims such as family support. Hence, if Bosnia wants to maintain 
current transfers of social capital through activities such as lobbying, advocacy, and 
networking between employers and colleagues in home and host country, formal 
recognition and administrative support is urgently needed (A. Telalović, personal 
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correspondence, June 2012). Regarding the transfer of knowledge, Telalović notes 
that “There is sufficient evidence to claim that contributions of BiH scientific diaspora 
would be much higher ... if there were some systemic support provided by the 
authorities” (ibid.). Currently, for example, the absence of adequate legislative 
arrangements for visiting professors and lack of efficient procedures for the 
recognition of foreign degrees form great obstacles to the contribution of knowledge 
that is available (ibid.). 
Despite the absence of a coherent policy strategy on migration and development, the 
Bosnian ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Human Rights and Refugees have 
executed a small number of programs during the last few years. These activities have 
mainly been of an assisting role, whereby the ministries participated in programs 
initiated by international organisations, such as the TOKTEN and TRQN programs, 
and diaspora organisations like a congress on BIH diaspora scientists organised by the 
Bosnian scientific migrant organisation BHAAAS (Tihić-Kadrić 2011). One of the 
few government initiatives that is aimed at the support of diaspora networking is the 
annual business directory that lists information on Bosnian migrant experts and 
professionals (Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Ottawa 2010). This initiative is 
a good example of the focus of government-supported programs on highly educated 
migrants. Additionally, these programs are of a sporadic nature and are not part of, 
nor do they lead to an overarching migration and development strategy. 
Considering its large diaspora population and the development potential it carries, 
Bosnia’s passive role in its adoption of a national legal framework is remarkable. Its 
stance on its diaspora is very much opposite to the current trend in many less-
developed sending countries that actively engage their diasporas in homeland 
contribution. Neither general policies on government engagement with its diaspora 
nor support in, or encouragement of, diaspora contributions in particular are anchored 
to a coherent national strategy. 
III. Policies that Directly Affect the Mobility of Capital or People 
A. German Immigration and Refugee Policies 
Whereas the progressive German migration and development policy effectively 
supports some German diaspora communities in their home country engagement, 
immigration policies at the same time have a counteractive effect. For example, 
permanent residents without the German nationality will lose their residence status if 
they stay outside of Germany for more than six consecutive months (Musekamp 
2008). This seriously limits the mobility of migrants to pay longer visits to family and 
friends, thereby potentially loosening ties with their homeland, and the possibility to 
transfer social and human capital. Bosnians who want to get around this rule through 
adopting German nationality are obliged to renounce their Bosnian citizenship, as 
Germany principally does not allow for dual nationality. It does have a few 
exemptions to this rule, but this mainly applies to immigrants of Turkish background 
(Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2008; Auswärtiges Amt 2006). Upon the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia adopted a law that allows for dual 
citizenship, but only with those countries with whom a bilateral agreement is signed. 
Such arrangements are most notably in place with Serbia and Croatia, to which two of 
the ethnic groups in Bosnia are related, but no such agreement exists between Bosnia 
and Germany (Štiks 2011). Nikolić et al. (2010) argue that “If the legislation isn’t 
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modified, the country runs the risk of losing a significant number of its citizens living 
abroad, and with them its human capital” (pp. 26-27). 
Policies that facilitate circular migration9 could provide a solution to this 
contribution obstacle. However, to date, German immigration policy does not have 
any provisions in place that facilitate or promote circular migration patterns. 
According to a research by Schneider and Parusel (2010), European approaches to 
circular migration generally seem to be mainly driven by labour market interests and 
appear to aim for meeting the short-term and sector-specific labour demands. The 
German focus on programs for temporary workers and highly skilled professionals 
underline this trend. A clear example comes from a program that was launched in 
2000 by former Chancellor Schröder, which aimed to recruit 20,000 highly skilled 
workers in the software industry. They were, however, not allowed to bring their 
families. It was only after intervention from human rights groups and experts that they 
changed this policy so that the immigrant workers could bring their families and settle 
(Hollifield 2007). 
An important factor that shapes the contribution environment is the characteristic of 
the immigrant population, and specifically the reason for migration. Since 
approximately half of all Bosnians in Germany were forced migrants that fled from 
war, German refugee policy at that time shaped their possibilities in Germany to a 
high degree. At the same time Germany took in the largest number of Bosnian 
refugees, it also had the harshest return policy. Immediately after the Dayton 
Agreement was signed, German authorities signed an agreement with Bosnia on the 
return of refugees and pressured refugees to repatriate. Approximately 300,000 
Bosnians left Germany to return to Bosnia or to resettle in third countries after 1995. 
Apart from a focus on return, German refugee policies limited refugee options during 
their time of stay. Instead of an official refugee status, most refugees, depending on 
the province, received temporary protection status, called Duldung (‘tolerated’), 
which required an unconditional departure from Germany upon the end of the war. 
After 1995, under duldung status, refugees could stay for six months at most and were 
expected to leave or apply for a renewal of their residence permit at the end of each 
given period. Some refugees had their permits repeatedly extended up to ten years and 
were then refused permanent residence and had to leave the country. People with 
demonstrable traumas had the chance to be awarded a permanent residence permit, 
but the criteria to receive this were very strict (Valenta and Ramet 2011). 
Since German refugee policy was, to a certain degree, dealt with at the regional 
level, it depended on the province or sometimes on the city as to whether refugees 
with duldung status were allowed to work or receive education (S. Pfohman, personal 
communication, 19 March 2012). However, in the majority of cities, Bosnian refugees 
were refused these rights (Valenta and Ramet 2011). Consequently, refugees were 
highly dependent on the German state for their survival and were unable to set up an 
independent life in Germany. Dimova (2006) argues that because of their uncertain 
legal status, Bosnian migrants were hindered in integrating into their new 
communities, expecting to be deported or imprisoned at any moment. Additionally, 
the same author argues that restrictionist German refugee policies, in particular those 
resulting in on-going uncertainty about legal status, have led to additional traumas of 
Bosnian refugees (Dimova 2006). Therefore, many experts perceive Germany as the 
country with the harshest conditions that Bosnian refugees experienced (Valenta and 
Ramet 2011). As a result, Bosnian refugees were struggling to survive and often did 
not have any money left to send home. Pfohman (personal communication, 19 March 
2012) notes that some refugees were even dependent on money sent by families and 
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friends from Bosnia. For those who received permanent residence status, there were 
often problems in finding a job due to traumas and troubles in acquiring language 
skills, which was especially the case for the elderly. Consequently, many Bosnians 
simply did not, and still do not, have the economic power to (financially) contribute to 
Bosnia (S. Pfohman, personal communication, 19 March 2012; R. Dimova, informal 
interview, 3 March 2012). 
 
B. Bosnian and German Policies to Facilitate and Encourage Financial 
Contributions 
Germany’s focus point concerning migrant remittances lies on shifting remittances 
from informal to formal transfer channels (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
2011). The positive development effect that formal remittances have, as a result of 
this formalisation policy, on Bosnia’s unstable economic infrastructure is, however, 
doubtful (de Haas 2006). At the same time, Germany is involved in assisting the 
reform of the Bosnian banking sector, although this runs via its regular development 
cooperation program (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2011). In the long 
run, this will probably contribute more to an enabling remittance environment in 
Bosnia than its current remittance formalisation policy. On the side of the sending 
country, Bosnia has no program in place that aims to provide financial incentives for 
migrants to engage in financial contribution to Bosnia, and not even a strategy on 
remittance capture (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). This absence 
of remittance services from the Bosnian government fits with the picture of a lack of 
resourcing role on the Bosnian side. With the absence of a facilitating and 
encouraging force from the Bosnian government, and keeping in mind the 
unfavourable business environment causing low trust in the Bosnian banking sector, 
the Bosnian diaspora in Germany is unlikely to increase its investment in its home 
country. Due to the low trust in the banking sector and a lack of government support, 
Bosnian migrants in Germany cannot use their money optimally through efficiently 
sending, investing, or saving in Bosnia. 
Explaining Policy Choices in Bosnia and Germany 
By researching the policy measures in three main policy fields, it has become 
apparent that both in Bosnia and in Germany many policy obstructions exist, 
notwithstanding the high diaspora potential. Consequently, the question arises as to 
why, despite Bosnian and German recognition of the development contribution 
potential of Bosnians in Germany, Bosnia has not adopted a diaspora policy and why 
Germany has obstructive immigration and refugee policies in place. 
On the side of the Bosnian government, the main impediment to an enabling 
diaspora contribution environment seems to be the absence of an official diaspora 
strategy. Without a government that is actively engaged in establishing a connection 
with its diaspora, the home country is unable to facilitate an enabling contribution 
environment. For Bosnia, a lack of state interest to provide support for Bosnian 
citizens living abroad appears to be widely prevalent. What is more, even for 
members of the Bosnian diaspora who express an interest in contributing to the 
development of Bosnia without asking for financial remuneration, little interest is 
shown by the Bosnian government. This is very much in contrast with the current 
trend of major emigrant countries who increasingly regard their diasporas as so-called 
‘agents for development’ and establish diaspora programs accordingly. 
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As Brinkerhoff (2012) has explained, for a sending government to take any action 
towards diaspora engagement, it first has to recognise its positive contribution value. 
For Bosnia it is rather unclear if the government has recognised its diaspora as such, 
since several congresses held on the topic and supported by the Ministry for Human 
Rights and Refugees make notion of diaspora recognition, but effective actions are 
missing. What is clear, however, is that up until now no official statement on diaspora 
recognition has been adopted in a policy motion, as happened in Germany in 2007. 
According to Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012), simply no consensus 
exists on the reasoning that “diaspora contributions are useful, needed and that they 
should receive recognition and systemic support from all administrative levels in 
BiH”. The reason for this absence of general recognition is, according to the assistant 
minister of the Department for Diaspora of the Ministry for Human Rights and 
Refugees, a lack of awareness of diaspora opportunities amongst decision makers in 
Bosnia and international organisations (Tihić-Kadrić 2011).  
One important factor that could provide for an explanation of Bosnia’s deviating 
diaspora stance is its recent history of civil war. Carling (2008) argues that, whereas 
diaspora contribution related issues are the same in a variety of migration settings, the 
context of forced migration can considerably influence the scope for policy 
intervention. In the case of Bosnia, its war history can be seen to have shaped policy 
intervention in a number of ways. First of all, immediate concerns such as economic 
and institutional reconstruction took up most government attention and are still on-
going. Pressing domestic issues such as the repatriation of refugees and internally 
displaced persons received policy priority, because of which little space was left for 
significant initiatives towards Bosnian citizens living abroad (Nikolić et al. 2010).  
Whether it is due to the war or because of other issues, another reason for Bosnia’s 
absent diaspora policy may be the government’s lacking ability to take action. Apart 
from Brinkerhoff’s caveat on the prerequisite of diaspora recognition, her caveat on 
governments not always being the most enabling power is also applicable to the case 
of Bosnia. According to a number of scholars, it is due to the inability of the Diaspora 
Department that no diaspora strategy has been adopted until now. The department is 
said to have very low capacity, a limited scope of work, and insufficient funding (N. 
Oruč, personal communication, 4 June 2012; Tihić-Kadrić 2011). Furthermore, the 
lack of data on Bosnian citizens abroad and the inability of the Diaspora Department 
to access such information structurally is also put forward as an obstacle to the 
establishment of a diaspora policy (Nikolić et al. 2010).  
Although a lack of ability provides for a practical explanation, it cannot explain the 
fact that a proposed law on diaspora policy, which the Diaspora Department has been 
able to draft, has been refused by the Council of Ministers. Here, Brinkerhoff’s caveat 
on government diaspora actions being dependent on how the government views its 
diaspora can provide for clarification. The Bosnian researcher Telalović (personal 
correspondence, June 2012) argues that, rather than viewing the Bosnian diaspora as a 
Bosnian community living abroad, they instead see the different ethnic Bosnian 
groups as being primarily linked to their ethnic roots. Hence, by many politicians in 
the BiH Parliament, Bosnian Serbs living abroad are considered Serbian diaspora, 
which is also fully supported by the authorities in Serbia. Likewise, Bosnian Croats 
are viewed, and treated by current Croat diaspora strategy, as Croat diaspora, and 
Bosniaks are seen as Bosniak instead of Bosnian diaspora. This political stance is not 
fully adopted by the entire Bosnian diaspora, as worldwide various Bosnian diaspora 
organisations exist that are ethnically mixed and foremost consider themselves 
Bosnians (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). This suggests that, in 
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fact, the Bosnian government has not recognised its diaspora fully, and do not 
consider them as being linked to Bosnia in the first place. 
In addition, the notion that sending governments may view diaspora engagement as a 
threat is also pertinent to the case of Bosnia. The core of the reason for a diaspora 
perception of threat lies in the ethnic division of Bosnia’s political structure. Because 
of this delicate political structure in the division of power, any involvement of the 
diaspora forms a threat to the political equilibrium. Even migrant contributions that 
support economic development might increase the influence of the diaspora or some 
ethnic groups within it, and could affect the fragile ethnic balance of power (N. Oruč, 
personal communication, 4 June 2012). Furthermore, some politicians fear that any 
systemic government support to the Bosnian diaspora might lead to a large-scale 
return of emigrants, which would alter the ethnic composition and could shift the 
balance of power (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012). All together, it 
can be argued that whereas many sending countries facilitate the political engagement 
of their diasporas (Bakewell 2012), Bosnia’s delicate political environment does not 
provide the possibility for its diaspora to wield any political power. 
In addition to explanations at the national level, further explanations can also be 
found in connection with international actors. The theory of Delgado Wise and 
Márquez Covarrubias on the northern dominance in setting migration and 
development regulation can be applied to the role the EU plays with regard to Bosnia. 
At present, Bosnia has started the EU accession process, and in this regard is expected 
to fulfil a list of EU accession requirements. Not only does this cause a dependent 
position towards the EU and EU member countries, it also influences Bosnian policy 
priorities. Following the dominant northern approach in migration and development, 
which pursues the western need for workers and at the same time the protection of 
national sovereignty, the migration agenda of the EU is primarily determined by its 
security and economic interests and therefore mainly focuses on selective immigration 
and asylum (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). As a result, according to Telalović 
(personal correspondence, June 2012), the migration and development pillar of the 
EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility is “just an empty phrase”. 
Consequently, the issue of emigration is ignored in the EU accession process, and 
linking migrants’ resources with development is not on the list of EU accession 
criteria (A. Telalović, personal correspondence, June 2012; Tihić-Kadrić 2011). With 
its limited capacity then, the Bosnian government’s attention goes primarily to those 
points that the EU requires them to achieve. Since diaspora engagement is not on the 
list of accession requirements, the government does not feel obliged to include it in 
their policy priorities. According to Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012), 
if the EU were to include the issue of diaspora on the accession agenda, it would be 
likely that Bosnian local authorities would be more proactive. Moreover, for those 
who ignore the diaspora issue out of their own political interests, the absence of the 
issue on the EU list of accession priorities forms a good excuse to ignore the topic, 
claiming it is not relevant to Bosnia and no consensus within the Bosnian government 
is required (ibid.). 
Another form of international dominance lies in the bilateral relation between 
Germany and Bosnia, in which Germany can decide the regulation of immigration 
and also, previously, refugee policies. The German government has consistently put 
the focus on return in both cases. The focus of German refugee policy was in line with 
the trend among northern host countries to view repatriation as the most preferred 
durable solution to refugee problems and can be explained as a component of general 
political restrictionism (Eastmond 2006). Where it concerns current migration and 
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development programs, the focus of Germany in many projects also lies on return. An 
example forms the only bilateral migration and development program between Bosnia 
and Germany which concentrates on the transfer of social and human capital through 
return. 
This can be partly explained by Germany’s perception of return as a once-and-for-all 
event (ibid.) and circular migration either as final return or temporary stay, instead of 
as a permanent stay with the freedom of mobility. More importantly, Germany’s call 
for circular migration shows more their interest in repatriation and prevention of 
uncontrolled and irregular immigration (Musekamp 2008). This is in line with 
Musekamp’s (2008) argumentation that national aims such as the control and 
restriction of immigration often takes first priority. However, Germany still receives 
immigrants and even has programs in place to attract high-skilled workers. This 
apparent contradiction can be explained by Hollifield’s liberal paradox. On the one 
hand, Germany pursues a policy of political restrictionism so as to warrant security 
and defend national sovereignty. At the same time, a need for labourers pushes for a 
policy of economic openness. This may explain why Germany has its main focus in 
migration on temporary workers and professionals. The previous example of a 
program introduced by former Chancellor Schröder, on the recruitment of 20,000 
highly skilled workers, exemplifies Germany’s liberal paradox of economic openness 
and political closure that is prevalent in its immigration and migration and 
development policies. However, for the number of Bosnian immigrants that entered 
Germany as refugees, it should be noted that they were initially subject to German 
refugee policy. Hence, their initial entry and treatment cannot be explained by the 
focus on specific labour policy that forms one side of the liberal paradox, them only 
being subject to this policy after they received permanent residence status. German 
refugee policy should therefore, even though it bears a similar restrictive character, be 
distinguished from the protective immigration policy that forms the second side of the 
explanation of the liberal paradox. 
Conclusion: Politics as Obstacle to Diasporasʼ Development 
Contribution Potential 
This study examined the ways in which Bosnian and German government policies 
affect diaspora contribution potential to the development of Bosnia and asked why 
contribution obstructing policies are in place as well as why constructive contribution 
supporting policies are lacking. Due to the very high percentage of Bosnians that live 
outside Bosnia (38.9%) and the considerable number that live in Germany, the 
German Bosnian diaspora has a large potential to serve as ‘agents for development’. 
There are, however, a number of policies from the side of the sending country as well 
as the receiving country that negatively affect the contribution environment and hence 
hinder effective Bosnian development contribution. This paper has argued that the 
Bosnian contribution potential could be more fulfilled if constructive policy support 
from both German and Bosnian governments would be in place. 
For Bosnia, the absence of an official diaspora policy is mainly the result of political 
unwillingness and inability to form a consensus, whereas Germany’s focus on 
temporary and high-skilled immigration are brought about by a northern trend of a 
policy of economic openness on the one hand and political restrictionism on the other. 
By researching the reasons behind why policies are in place despite their obstructive 
effects to diaspora contributions, this case study suggests that, both in Bosnia and in 
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Germany, national and international politics are the main obstructing factors to an 
enabling contribution environment.  
Where it concerns the political implementation of this paper’s conclusions, in order 
to create the adequate systemic support that is currently lacking from the side of the 
Bosnian government, an official consensus must be reached that recognises the value 
of its diaspora and the government’s responsibility to facilitate diaspora contribution. 
According to Telalović (personal correspondence, June 2012), one of the few methods 
by which this could be reached would be through public campaigns that would raise 
wider awareness among the Bosnian population, the academic sector, NGOs, 
governments at all levels and international development agencies. Nevertheless, 
looking at the northern dominance in migration and development and Bosnian 
subordination to institutions such as the EU, the responsibility for taking actions that 
change migrant potential into contribution should not only be recognised at the 
national, but also at the international level. 
Notes 
1. Hereafter referred to as ‘Bosnia’ or ‘BiH’. 
2. Following Brinkerhoff’s model, Uphoff’s originally sixth power resource of physical power is 
excluded here. 
3. This amount only includes registered transfers via banking systems. According to the World 
Network of Bosnian Diaspora, the actual amount, which also includes informal transfers, lies 
approximately three times higher (Oruč 2011). 
4. For example, every other Sunday a life broadcast for diaspora from the Balkan region can be 
followed via the internet at http://www.rdl.de/stream.htm. Moreover, a whole range of Bosnian 
radio channels can be accessed online at http://de.delicast.com/radio/Bosnien-Herz.  
5. An example is http://www2.dw-world.de/bosnian.  
6. It concerns the motion Diaspora – Potenziale von Migrantinnen und Migranten für die 
Entwicklung der Herkunftsländer nutzen (Deutscher Bundestag 2007). 
7. Some examples of these conferences are the TAIEX Multi-country Workshop: Linking 
Migration and Development of the Western Balkans Countries, MobilizeDiaspora4SD: 
Mobilization of Intellectual and Financial Resources from Diaspora for Knowledge Based 
Sustainable Development in SEE, and Emigration Issues in the Western Balkans - joint 
approach to linking migration and development of the countries of origin, which all took place 
in 2011. 
8. These being the BiH Strategy of Development, the BiH Strategy of Social Inclusion, and the 
BiH Strategy of Migration and Asylum (R. Tihić-Kadrić, official correspondence, 7 August 
2012). 
9. The definition of circular migration that is used in this paper comes from the IOM and is as 
follows: “a continuing, long-term, and fluid movement of people between countries, including 
both temporary and more permanent movements” (Newland and Agunias 2007: 3). 
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